AAM DISPATCH

The largest spy-swap since the end of the Cold War between the US and Russia took place on the tarmac of the airport in Vienna. In the groundbreaking deal, the US transferred ten Russian agents for four people convicted in Russia for spying for the US.

The ten suspects were arrested on June 27th in the US, and one in Cyprus. They were accused of being undercover spies who attempted to penetrate the top levels of US policy-making. The arrests followed a decade-long investigation by US authorities and accuse suspects of attempting to acquire intelligence on nuclear weapons, the global gold market, the CIA, and US foreign and security policy.

AAM talks with several experts to discuss the Russian spy case and its implications. Bios at end of post.

Will the US and Russia be able to maintain their improved relationship, or will it hinder any current collaboration between the two countries?

Charles Kupchan: Washington and Moscow both appear intent on limiting the damage that the spy case could have on bilateral relations. Leaders on both sides seem committed to pushing ahead with the “reset” and containing the fall-out of this episode. Domestic political pressures could interfere. Skepticism toward Russia on Capitol Hill stemming from this case could, for example, make it harder to win Senate ratification of the new Start Treaty.

Dex Torricke-Barton: I think Russia and the United States will both be keen to bury this affair as quickly as possible, and to preserve the progress made in the relationship over the last 18 months. The two countries are collaborating on a wide range of issues today, all with important implications for global security – Iran, nuclear proliferation and Kyrgyzstan to name just some of the recent headline cases. These things touch on the deepest national interests of the two sides, and the spy affair simply isn’t a priority compared to them. There’ll be some degree of domestic political opposition in the US to further collaboration with Russia, but I expect this will mostly be rhetoric.

What will be really interesting to see is if criticism over the spy case becomes a starting point for a more general attack on ‘the Obama doctrine’, the entire notion that engagement and dialogue can change the behavior of other states. That could help feed into perceptions, which the Republicans are doing their best to support, that President Obama is weak on national security and has pursued a naive international agenda which has compromised American interests.

James Goldgeier: Presidents Obama and Medvedev are clearly committed to improving US-Russian relations so they will not let this case get in the way of the work they are doing. It’s important, however, that everyone remains realistic about the relationship. The United States and Russia do have some common interests, and the presidents seem to want to cooperate on those. But they also have different interests, and conflicts between the two countries are likely to arise.

Alex Gabouew: I think that the way the case was handeled by US and Russian authorities shows that both sides want to maintain their improved relationship and cause no trouble to the reset. Moscow and Washington proceeded to a very swift and succesfull deal: diplomats and secret services started negotiations immediately after the arrests. The whole case showed improved level of cooperation and mutual openness, shich survived even a crisis situation. I guess the US-Russia relationship became more sustainable and if Moscow is wise enough we should no expect any Russian “response”.

How does this case compare to past espionage cases, and what do you think it says about Russia’s methods and aims with these alleged spies?

CK: The supposed focus of the spy ring on open sources and making connections with influential Americans seems odd. Much of the information the “illegals” were gathering could easily be obtained via the internet, newspapers, and television. It is curious that the Russian government felt it worth the time and money to maintain this kind of network.

DTB: Most of the previous big spying incidents have been a lot more sophisticated, probably because agents were professionals who were planted in the US via institutional contexts, imposed as a result of old Cold War constraints on travel and immigration. Spies would be placed in news agencies, trade missions or diplomatic environments. This time, we’re seeing the results of relying on basically a group of amateurs to try and get hold of not classified, but certainly privileged information and analysis. The fact that Russia has been using these sort of people shows that it is probably still very good at using professionals to infiltrate all those other institutional settings and accessing the raw intelligence, but really wants help in diversifying its sources, and getting help in interpreting that data. Unfortunately for them, the risks and limitations of using these amateurs have been clearly shown.

JG: We still don’t know all the details, but it is hard to imagine that Russia gained any useful information from these individuals that they could not have gained from simply surfing the web. It isn’t comparable to the kinds of breaches of national security that have occurred periodically in the past decades.

AG: The case showed that Russia’s secret services are so much 20th century. They use methods which were relevant some 30 years ago. But it is a very logical consequence of what was happening with former KGB in last 20 years. After the fall of USSR the intelligence servicse were financed very poorly – the state didn’t invest much money, so the SVR had no ability to develope. The most professional people were purged or moved into business because a department head at SVR made just about 1500 US dollars a year. The figure improved under Putin but not too significantly. The source of income for many officers is corruption and sheltering businesses. So professionalism is difficult to find. Note that all the spies were sent to the US by Vladimir Putin – a former KGB-man with very poor careeer record.

Using “illegals” to make contacts which a young journalist could make in a week, or to approach think tank members is ridiculous. The aims are ridiculous as well. For me the Chinese with their technology-espionage in the US (and Russia) are much more 21st century.

Will the discovery of this alleged spy ring affect Russia’s image and relations with other countries besides the US?

CK: I expect it will blow over without long-lasting damage to Russia’s international image. Even friendly countries spy on each other. Russia’s image will ultimately be more influenced by its relations with its neighbors and the quality of its strategic cooperation in meeting common challenges in areas such as nonproliferation, energy security, arms control, and counterterrorism.

DTB: I doubt this is going to affect Russia’s relations with other countries in any serious way. Foreign policy hawks in a number of countries, such as Britain, have been trying to exaggerate the threat posed by Russian espionage since this affair broke. But frankly, most countries never stopped defending against that kind of threat, so they won’t be too surprised or alarmed by what happened. Spying on other countries, including your allies, is everyday business in global politics.

JG: Countries have intelligence agencies, and those agencies spy on other countries. Russia is not unique in that regard, and no one should be surprised at their continued efforts to get information in the US and elsewhere.

AG: I don’t think so. Every major state has intelligence services, many have spies, somtimes some of them get exposed. The difference is it is not leaked to the media.

CHARLES KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University. He is also Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Director for European Affairs on the US National Security Council during the first Clinton administration. He is the author of How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (2010) and The End of the America Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (2002).

DEX TORRICKE-BARTON is an international security analyst with the United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General in New York.

JAMES GOLDGEIER is Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a specialist on transatlantic relations and US-Russian relations. He is an award-winning author, former State Department official, and staff member of the National Security Council. Professor of political science and international politics at George Washington University. Author of the book America Between the Wars (with Derek Chollet, PublicAffairs Books, June 2008) and the recent Council Special Report The Future of NATO (January 2010).

ALEX GABUEV is political correspondent for Kommersant, the leading Russian business newspaper. He formerly served as China correspondent for the newspaper. He has published more than 700 articles covering all aspects of Russian domestic and foreign policy.

Javier Barrera