Eight years after 9/11, the United States should be far less worried about domestic terrorist attacks and far more concerned about foreign attacks on Western brands, an effective public diplomacy message and well-spent development aid.
At least, that was the consensus from the fourth annual day-long conference on Al-Qaeda put on by the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. Organizers noted that while conferences in past years separated tactics from diplomacy and diplomacy from aid packages, the separate strands of each of these worlds are now inseparable.
One State Department official spoke of a changed attitude in the government, an attitude that has USAID speaking the language of COIN strategy and the Department of Defense running international health missions. Yet a panel examining the economic dimensions of fighting Al-Qaeda admitted that smaller is sometimes better and aid can create as many enemies as it is meant to solidify allies.
David Katz, a career foreign service officer, who worked in Afghanistan’s Nuristan province from 2006-7 said:
“There’s an assumption that our aid wins hearts and minds but if you’re an aid worker you know that aid frustrates a lot of people…. Aid contributes to instability, especially in the south [of Afghanistan] – it creates enemies and a lot of the money goes to the Taliban.”
Robert Jenkins of the U.S. Department of State, admitted the U.S. is already on the defensive if it’s going into area, attempting to use aid as a means of fighting terrorism:
“Perception is everything in these environments. If I’m a young man or woman and I’m hearing that these projects are supposed to be making my life better and they’re not, then I’m not going to buy into the system.”
Lower-impact projects seem to be the answer. Aid divided into smaller bundles and distributed the way the locals want and where they want it. As Katz noted, “You will often find that you get a lot more out of a $30,000 project than a $30 million project.”
But what about those who are already moving beyond the reach of aid? A de-radicalization program in Yemen failed by casting a wide net and rounding up any young man suspected of harboring anti-government or terrorist tendencies. A Saudi government program has made some small gains by enlisting Muslim volunteers to infilitrate chat rooms and rebut supposedly theologically-based arguments for jihad. Dr Abdulrahman al-Hadlag from the Saudi Ministry of Interior, noted that the factors that contributed to participation in jihad were “almost all related to media.”
The Saudi radicals in the program were primarily men in their early to mid-20s, most often from average-sized middle class families. The keys to radicalization appear to be weak parental control – the young men often had fathers over the age of 60 – and exposure to images of Western dominance and alleged brutality in Afghanistan and Iraq. Television shows, Web sites and radio programs fueled a frustration and sense of impotence eventually leading to travel to jihadist hot spots and association with like minded young men who provided a sense of belonging and validation.
Peter Bergen, co-director of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy at the New America Foundation, believes that the terrorist threat here in the United States is “close to zero. Al-Qaeda has found it extraordinairly difficult to recruit American Muslims.”
Bergen notes that the threats planned by American Muslims have come from specific communities – Afghan-Americans, Somalis and African-American and Latino converts.
“These communities look a lot like European domestic attacks from Muslim communities. You have those who don’t have as much, who don’t have job prospects and who live in ghettos.”
Bergen says that while Al-Qaeda has ineffectively managed its public relations strategy and managed to alienate possible sympathizers by killing Muslim civilians, several troubling trends emerge:
- More attacks on Isreali and Jewish targets
- More attacks on transportation and Western brands, such as bars and hotels
- American residents/citizens who travel overseas for suicide bombing missions
However, Bergen noted:
“It’s naïve to think that it’s impossible that it’s impossible it could happen here.
Katherine Gypson